Presented by

  • A/Prof Vanessa Teague

    A/Prof Vanessa Teague

    Vanessa Teague is a cryptographer with longstanding interests in elections and privacy. She divides her time between designing new protocols and explaining why other protocols are not secure. Recently she has worked on cryptographic examinations of voting systems in Switzerland and Australia, election audits in California, and data re-identification in Australia.


I'll begin with analysis of the Swiss e-voting system and its flawed proofs, then explain why the NSW iVote system is even worse. Next, I'll discuss the world's first pilot Risk-Limiting Audit of a preferential election, in San Francisco, and compare it to the completely non-existent auditing strategy for our Senate elections. Australia, once a leader in genuine democratic innovation, lags woefully behind the rest of the world in applying basic standards of privacy, transparency and security to electronic electoral processes. So why is it so bad, and what can we do about it? This talk includes joint work with Michelle Blom, Andrew Conway, Chris Culnane, Sarah Jamie Lewis, Olivier Periera, Philip Stark and Peter Stuckey. I'll conclude with some speculative ideas about improving democratic participation between elections - suggestions welcome. Linux Australia: YouTube: